AI Agent Control Checklists
Tiered controls for identity, secrets and egress, audit-event completeness, evidence portability, and exit — with the inspection that satisfies each one.
Who may approve, change, operate, suspend and retire an agent, through which lifecycle gates, with which registry record and retained evidence.
"Gate" in this framework always means a lifecycle gate - a decision point a client's agent passes through.
This framework answers one operating question:
Who may approve, change, operate, suspend and retire an agent, through which lifecycle gates, with which registry record and retained evidence?
It applies to a production AI system that includes an agent, from intake through retirement. It may also be used for a non-agentic AI system where the same decision rights are useful. The client maps its job titles and committees onto the functional accountabilities defined here.
NIST describes AI risk management as a continuous lifecycle activity organized through GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE and MANAGE. GOVERN is cross-cutting and informs the other three functions; NIST also states that documentation can improve transparency, human review and accountability. [G01] [G02] The NIST Playbook contains voluntary suggestions rather than a checklist that every organization must follow. [G03] This document therefore uses NIST as a source basis but presents an Alpha AI recommended operating method, not a NIST conformance claim.
NIST published the Generative AI Profile as a companion to AI RMF 1.0. [G04] NIST states that the Profile can help organizations identify risks specific to generative AI and select actions aligned with their goals and priorities. [G01] ISO describes ISO/IEC 42001 as an AI management-system standard using Plan-Do-Check-Act to govern organizational AI risks and opportunities. [G05] The OECD AI Principles address trustworthy AI across the AI lifecycle and were updated in May 2024. [G06]
The following are Alpha AI recommended design principles, informed by NIST's treatment of governance as continuous, cross-cutting and lifecycle-wide. [G01] [G02]
These are accountabilities, not job titles. One person may hold several roles for a lower-tier agent if conflicts are documented. For Tier 3 and Tier 4, the approver and independent assurance role must be different people.
| Functional role | Accountable for | May approve or decide | Must not self-approve |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governance authority | Organizational AI policy, risk appetite, tier definitions and unresolved high-impact exceptions | Policy, Tier 4 production use, Tier 4 risk acceptance, permanent stop | Its own assurance finding |
| Accountable business owner | Intended outcome, affected workflow, acceptable residual risk, funding and continued business need | Intake sponsor, business acceptance, Tier 1-3 residual risk within delegated authority, retirement | Technical validation or independent assurance |
| Agent product owner | Agent purpose, requirements, registry accuracy, change backlog and evidence coordination | Requirements baseline and non-material changes within an approved envelope | Production approval |
| Technical owner | Architecture, implementation, deployment integrity, recovery design and technical documentation | Build readiness and technical release candidate | Independent validation of its own work |
| Independent assurance owner | Independent challenge of risk tier, test sufficiency, control evidence and unresolved findings | Validation opinion; closure of assurance findings | The build or business acceptance |
| Operations owner | Monitoring, incident response, access to the kill mechanism, service review and operational evidence | Operational readiness; emergency suspension; restart within an approved runbook | Permanent risk acceptance |
| Data accountability owner | Permitted data use, classification, lineage, retention and deletion requirements | Data-use conditions and data readiness | Broader production approval |
| Registry custodian | Registry schema, record quality, attestations, status transitions and archive | Administrative completeness of a registry record | Business, risk or technical acceptance |
| Regulatory applicability owner | Determination of applicable legal and regulatory obligations with qualified counsel where required | Applicability decision and interpretation record | Technical validation |
A means final accountability, R prepares or executes, C must be consulted, I must be informed and V must record a positive independent validation before the decision passes. The client records named people against these functions in the agent registry.
| Decision | Governance authority | Business owner | Product owner | Technical owner | Assurance owner | Operations owner | Data owner | Regulatory owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accept intake and initial tier | C | A | R | C | C | I | C | C |
| Approve requirements and action boundary | C | A | R | C | C | C | C | C |
| Accept validation evidence | I | C | R | C | A | C | C | C |
| Approve Tier 1-2 production use | I | A | R | C | C | C | C | C |
| Approve Tier 3 production use | C | A | R | C | V | C | C | C |
| Approve Tier 4 production use | A | C | R | C | V | C | C | C |
| Suspend immediately | I | I | I | R | R | A | I | I |
| Approve a Tier 4 exception or renew an exception | A | C | R | C | C | C | C | C |
| Retire the agent | I | A | R | R | C | R | C | C |
NIST states that MAP establishes context for risk decisions, that MEASURE supplies documented testing and monitoring, and that MANAGE prioritizes and treats mapped and measured risks. [G02] This framework defines a four-tier interface so GOV1 can operate before GOV3 supplies the detailed control checklist and GOV4 supplies jurisdiction-specific regulatory mappings.
These tiers are an Alpha AI governance method. They are not legal classifications and must not be labelled with a jurisdiction's statutory risk categories.
| Tier | Governance description | Approval authority | Minimum evidence depth | Review cadence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — bounded assistive | Produces reversible drafts or analysis; a person decides and executes; no sensitive data or consequential reliance | Accountable business owner | Purpose, owner, data sources, acceptance criteria, basic evaluation, operating instructions | At material change and at least annually |
| Tier 2 — consequential advisory | Influences a material workflow or uses sensitive/internal data, but a competent person remains the decision-maker and actor | Business owner, with assurance consultation | Tier 1 plus documented risk assessment, representative evaluation, data approval, human-review design, monitoring and rollback evidence | At material change and at least semi-annually |
| Tier 3 — action-capable | Can change a system, communicate externally, commit resources, or call tools with material effect under bounded authority | Business owner and independent assurance owner | Tier 2 plus action-boundary tests, failure and abuse tests, approval-path evidence, kill-switch exercise, incident runbook and change controls | At material change and at least quarterly |
| Tier 4 — high-impact or unresolved applicability | Can materially affect rights, safety, legal position, essential services or other impact above organizational tolerance; or regulatory applicability is unresolved | Governance authority and independent assurance owner, after recorded regulatory applicability determination | Tier 3 plus enhanced independent review, explicit residual-risk decision, regulatory applicability record, scenario exercise and governance-authority approval | At material change and at least quarterly; more often if the applicability record requires it |
The product owner prepares an initial tier proposal. The business owner is accountable for the proposal, and independent assurance challenges Tier 2-4 classifications. The assigned tier is the highest tier triggered by the agent's data, users, decisions, actions, scale or failure impact.
Escalate at least one tier, or record why escalation is unnecessary, when the agent:
Open GOV4 dependency: GOV4 must define the regulatory applicability assessment and the jurisdiction-specific triggers that can set a tier floor, require additional evidence or prohibit deployment. Until that record exists, unresolved applicability is Tier 4 and cannot be downgraded by the product or technical owner.
NIST treats AI risk management as iterative across the lifecycle rather than a one-time approval. [G01] [G02] The eight gates below implement that concept as an Alpha AI recommended operating process. Every gate has a binary exit condition, a retained artifact and a role accountable for retention.
| Gate | Testable exit condition | Named retained evidence | Evidence retained by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Intake | A business owner, product owner and intended outcome are named; prohibited purposes and a stop condition are recorded; initial tier is approved | Agent intake record | Registry custodian |
| 2. Design | The deployment brief defines users, workflow, data, actions, human decisions, acceptance criteria, architecture boundary and open GOV4 dependency; required approvers sign the baseline | Approved deployment brief and risk-context record | Agent product owner |
| 3. Build readiness | The technical owner shows that the versioned design is implementable in the client-approved environment and that every planned tool, model, data source and dependency has an owner and review path | Build-readiness record and version manifest | Technical owner |
| 4. Validation | All tier-required evaluations and failure scenarios meet pre-agreed thresholds; unresolved failures are either closed or recorded as approved, unexpired exceptions | Validation report and findings register | Independent assurance owner |
| 5. Production approval | The registry record is complete; Gates 1-4 are current; operations accepts the runbook and kill mechanism; required decision-makers for the tier sign the residual-risk decision | Production authorization record | Registry custodian |
| 6. Operation and change | Monitoring, incidents, access reviews, evaluations, exceptions and material-change triggers are reviewed at the tier cadence; each material change is routed back to the earliest affected gate before release | Periodic governance review and change-classification record | Operations owner |
| 7. Suspension and restart | A suspension trigger disables the agent or removes action authority; restart occurs only after containment, impact assessment, corrective action, re-validation and approval at the tier's production authority | Suspension, incident and restart authorization record | Operations owner |
| 8. Retirement | Action authority and access are revoked; deployments and scheduled work are stopped; retained data and evidence are disposed of or archived under approved rules; dependencies and users are notified | Retirement attestation and archived registry record | Registry custodian |
A change is material when it could alter purpose, users, affected parties, data, decision rights, action scope, risk tier, acceptance criteria or the evidence supporting an approval. The product owner records the classification and routes a material change to the earliest gate whose evidence is no longer valid. Independent assurance may override a non-material classification for Tier 2-4.
The registry is the authoritative governance record, not necessarily the runtime's technical inventory. NIST describes documentation as supporting transparency, human review and accountability, and its GOVERN function includes processes and organizational schemes across the lifecycle. [G02]
Each production agent record contains:
The model record may be separate, but the agent record must resolve to the exact approved model and configuration version. A shared model does not replace an agent record because the agent's purpose, tools, data and decision rights can differ.
At each scheduled review, the business owner attests continued need and ownership; the product owner attests record accuracy; operations attests current operating evidence; and assurance records unresolved findings. Missing ownership, an expired approval or an overdue Tier 3-4 review blocks new material changes and triggers a suspension decision.
An exception does not silently change a gate. It temporarily records why a requirement cannot be met and how exposure is constrained.
Every exception record includes:
The approving authority is the same authority required for production at that tier, except Tier 4 and expired exceptions always require the governance authority. An exception cannot waive an applicable law; GOV4 determines the applicability interface. On expiry, the agent is suspended unless the requirement is met or a new exception is approved using current evidence.
The OECD Principles frame accountability across the AI lifecycle, while NIST describes MANAGE as regular prioritization, treatment, monitoring and improvement based on mapped and measured risk. [G02] [G06] GOV1 therefore defines the management questions and handoffs, while GOV5 defines the report and GOV6 defines the audit evidence pack.
The governance authority receives, at least quarterly:
Handoffs to later deliverables:
| GOV1 output | Consumer |
|---|---|
| Tier, owner and review cadence | GOV3 control checklist; GOV4 regulatory mapping |
| Gate and evidence names | GOV3 control checklist; GOV6 audit evidence pack |
| Regulatory applicability status | GOV4 regulatory mapping |
| Management questions and decision log | GOV5 compliance reporting framework |
| Registry schema and evidence links | GOV6 audit evidence pack |
All references resolve to sources/SOURCES.md.
This document carries 22 bracketed citation markers drawn from
6 registered sources. A marker such as
[GOV101] identifies a row in the document's source
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Tiered controls for identity, secrets and egress, audit-event completeness, evidence portability, and exit — with the inspection that satisfies each one.
The threats a production agent is exposed to, the control that answers each one, and the evidence that demonstrates the control actually holds.
Architecture patterns for production agents, chosen from constraints and tested behaviour rather than from a diagram or a vendor feature list.
What each enterprise agent runtime documents it supports, recorded as vendor-documented scope rather than as a recommendation.
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